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Abstract: 
This study examines overconfidence in phishing email detection. Researchers believe that overconfidence (i.e., where 
one’s judgmental confidence exceeds one’s actual performance in decision making) can lead to one’s adopting risky 
behavior in uncertain situations. This study focuses on what leads to overconfidence in phishing detection. We 
performed a survey experiment with 600 subjects to collect empirical data for the study. In the experiment, each 
subject judged a set of randomly selected phishing emails and authentic business emails. Specifically, we examined 
two metrics of overconfidence (i.e., overprecision and overestimation). Results show that cognitive effort decreased 
overconfidence, while variability in attention allocation, dispositional optimism, and familiarity with the business entities 
in the emails all increased overconfidence in phishing email detection. The effect of perceived self-efficacy of 
detecting phishing emails on overconfidence was marginal. In addition, all confidence beliefs poorly predicted 
detection accuracy and poorly explained its variance, which highlights the issue of relying on them to guide one’s 
behavior in detecting phishing. We discuss mechanisms to reduce overconfidence. 
Keywords: Phishing Email Detection, Overconfidence, Judgmental Bias, Judgmental Confidence, Judgmental 
Accuracy, Phishing Detection Self-efficacy, Cognitive Strategies, Motivational Factors. 
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1 Introduction 
Phishing causes significant financial loss and erodes trust in online business communications (Symantec, 
2014). Understanding why people fall for phishing attacks (e.g., replying to a fraudulent email with personal 
information such as bank accounts, credit card numbers, and even social security numbers) despite the 
ubiquity of technology solutions has drawn much research attention (Kumaraguru, Sheng, Acquisti, Cranor, 
& Hong, 2010; Sheng, Magnien, Kumaraguru, Acquisti, & Cranor, 2007). To develop effective 
countermeasures and intervening programs to fight phishing, researchers have taken a behavioral approach 
to understand users’ motivations, beliefs, and mental models in phishing detection (Downs, Holbrook, & 
Cranor, 2006; Hong 2012). As individuals’ initial judgment of an email largely determines their subsequent 
behavioral reaction to the email’s requests, this study brings an important aspect of decision making, 
confidence, in exploring individuals’ judgmental processes in detecting phishing emails. 
Research in behavioral decision making suggests that confidence plays a critical role in predicting human 
behavior and that individuals who are more confident with their judgment behave more consistently with it 
(Fazio & Zanna, 1978). However, if a person’s confidence is misplaced 1, where confidence exceeds 
performance, it may lead the person to adopting risky or erroneous behavior (Moore & Healy, 2008). In the 
context of phishing detection, for instance, a person who judges a phishing email as a genuine business 
email with high confidence (i.e., the person is overconfident) may respond to the email and release personal 
information and, thus, cause identity theft; if the person makes the same wrong judgment with low 
confidence (i.e., the person is less overconfident), the person may avoid such consequence by taking further 
action to verify the email’s authenticity. Similarly, a person who mistakes an authentic email (such as a bank 
notice) for a phishing email with high confidence would ignore the email and, thus, take no action; if the 
person makes the same false judgment but with low confidence, the person may spend more time verifying 
the email’s authenticity. As Tang et al (2014) note, “overconfidence may cause people to take an action that 
they should not take, possibly leading to suboptimal outcomes or even disasters (p. 26)”. This illustration of 
judgmental confidence and the issue of overconfidence in phishing detection implies that a better 
correspondence between confidence and accuracy would help prevent one from falling to phishing.  
To the best of our knowledge, little research has focused on understanding overconfidence in phishing 
detection (and in security threat assessment as well). Although prior studies (Hong, Kelley, Tembe, 
Murphy-Hill, & Mayhorn, 2013; Dhamija, Tygar, & Hearst, 2006; Downs et al., 2006; Kumaraguru, Rhee, 
Acquisti, Cranor, & Hong, 2007) hint at the possible existence of overconfidence in individuals’ phishing 
detection, the nature of confidence and subsequently overconfidence deserve further investigation. For 
instance, Hong et al. (2013) studied confidence as a person’s self-efficacy beliefs (Stone, 2000): they first 
measured subjects’ prior experience with phishing attacks and found, “approximately 92% of participants 
misclassified phishing emails even though 89% indicated they were confident of their ability to identify 
phishing emails (p. 4)”. Interestingly, Hayes, Tanner, and Schmidt (2012, p. 109) applied a similar 
technique to measure confidence (i.e., “confidence in their knowledge of viruses, Trojans, spyware, and 
phishing attacks”) in a study on small business professionals’ knowledge of computer threats but found no 
evidence of overconfidence. Both studies compared prospective confidence (Busey, Tunnicliff, Loftus, & 
Loftus, 2000) prior to the judgment with task performance in threat detection but not retrospective 
confidence (or one’s judgmental confidence; Tang, Hess, Valacich, & Sweeney, 2014) after a judgment 
was made, similar to most other behavioral decision making studies (Koriat, Lichtenstein, & Fischhoff, 
1980; Lichtenstein & Fischhoff, 1977; Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, & Phillips, 1982). These conflicting but 
limited results mean we need to better understand confidence and overconfidence in phishing detection.  
In this study, we distinguish retrospective confidence (i.e., judgmental confidence) from prospective 
confidence (e.g., self-efficacy beliefs; Busey et al., 2000) and examine factors that cause one’s 
retrospective overconfidence in phishing detection. We present a starting point to devise intervention 
programs to address this type of bias and to improve effectiveness in phishing detection. For simplicity, 
we use the term overconfidence for retrospective overconfidence. Drawing from psychological literature in 
judgment under uncertainty (Heath & Tversky, 1991; Johnson & Payne, 1985; Keren, 1997; Koriat et al., 
1980; Libby & Rennekamp, 2011; Payne, 1982), we analyze cognitive and motivational factors that 
influence overconfidence, including cognitive effort, variability in attention allocation, familiarity with the 
business entities in the emails, perceived self-efficacy in detecting phishing emails, and dispositional 
optimism. We carried out a national survey experiment with 600 subjects to test the research model. The 
                                                     
1 People are either overconfident or underconfident depending on whether their judgmental confidence is higher or lower than their 
actual performance. 
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survey asked each participant to judge a set of emails randomly drawn from a pool of phishing emails and 
authentic business emails. We measured their judgmental confidence and accuracy, and we used two 
alternative operationalization metrics (i.e., overprecision and overestimation) to measure the extent of 
their overconfidence. The results we obtained from regression analysis show that cognitive effort reduced 
overconfidence while variability in attention allocation, dispositional optimism, and familiarity with the 
business entities all increased overconfidence in phishing detection. Perceived self-efficacy had a 
marginal effect on detecting phishing. In addition, all confidence beliefs—prospective confidence such as 
self-efficacy beliefs, and retrospective confidence (or judgmental confidence)—poorly predicted detection 
accuracy and poorly explained its variance, which highlights the issue of relying on confidence beliefs to 
guide one’s behavior in phishing detection. We discuss our findings’ implications at the end of the paper. 
Our sample from a broad demographic basis provides evidence of the prevalence of overconfidence in 
phishing detection. As such, both research and practice need to pay more attention to this issue. This 
study makes two contributions. First, to our knowledge, this is the first systematic study on retrospective 
overconfidence in phishing email detection. We conceptualize and measure retrospective overconfidence 
as differing from overconfidence in the context of self-efficacy beliefs and, thus, help advance theories in 
both behavioral decision making and phishing detection. Second, the study identifies several factors that 
influence overconfidence, which enables researchers and practitioners to devise practical mechanisms to 
help users reduce bias and improve judgment, such as providing feedback to individuals in confidence 
training (Moores & Chang, 2009; Sharp, Cutler, & Penrod, 1988). 
2 Conceptualization and Theoretical Background 
In this section, we conceptualize overconfidence and several related concepts (Table 1 summarizes the 
main concepts). We also introduce corresponding theories of overconfidence’s causes. 
Table 1. Explanations of Key Concepts 
Concepts Explanations 
Confidence 
There are two types of confidence in judgmental tasks (Busey et al., 2000): prospective confidence, 
which refers to the confidence in one’s ability to make good judgments (e.g., “I can effectively 
detect phishing emails”); and retrospective confidence (also called judgmental confidence; Berger, 
1992), which refers to the degree to which individuals believe that their judgment is accurate (e.g., 
“I am very much sure that my judgment on this email is correct”).  
 
In our study, we focus on retrospective confidence in judgments. For simplicity and consistency 
with literature (e.g., Keren, 1997; Tang et al., 2014), we use the terms retrospective confidence and 
confidence interchangeably.  
 
One’s confidence in judgment can be high or low regardless of what judgment one makes or its 
correctness. For instance, a person may judge an email to be a phishing email (or an authentic 
email) with high or low confidence (see examples in Section 1). 
Accuracy Also called judgmental performance, accuracy refers to the correctness of one’s judgments in a task. 
Overconfidence 
Overconfidence refers to the extent to which confidence exceeds performance (or accuracy). 
Because there are two types of confidence, there are correspondingly two types of overconfidence: 
prospective overconfidence (e.g., when one compares their performance with their self-efficacy 
beliefs; Moores & Chang, 2009; Stone, 1994) and retrospective overconfidence (i.e., when one 
compares their performance with their judgmental confidence; Keren, 1997; Tang et al., 2014). In 
this study, we examine the latter. 
 
As overconfidence is the difference between confidence and performance, it differs from “high” 
confidence: a person can be overconfident even if that individual has low confidence and if the 
accuracy is even lower than confidence. 
2.1 Confidence, Accuracy, and Overconfidence 
While much research in phishing detection has focused on judgmental accuracy (i.e., whether a participant 
correctly identifies a phishing email or not), one should not ignore the importance of judgmental confidence. 
Studies in behavioral decision making suggest that judgmental confidence plays a critical role in predicting 
human behavior because it moderates the judgment-behavior relationship (Berger, 1992; Berger & Mitchell, 
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1989; Fazio & Zanna, 1978; Ho & Bodoff, 2014). These findings suggest that individuals more confident in 
judging emails for phishing will take more definite action in response to them (either to follow the instructions 
in the emails if they believe they are authentic or delete/ignore them if they believe they are phishing emails). 
They also suggest that individuals less confident in judging emails for phishing may make more effort to 
verify the authenticity of the email such as contacting the email sender by phone. 
 
Figure 1. Confidence, Accuracy, and Overconfidence 
Judgmental confidence differs from another type of confidence belief: self-efficacy. Self-efficacy reflects 
one’s prospective confidence (Busey et al., 2000); that is, confidence in one’s ability to accomplish a task 
(Bandura, 1997; Cramer, Neal, & Brodsky, 2009; Stone, 2000) rather than confidence in how well one 
achieves it (Stone, 2000). Social cognitive theory (Bandura, 1997) suggests that self-efficacy beliefs may 
exceed one’s actual ability to maintain motivation and perseverance to accomplish a task. Factors such as 
past performance and vicarious experience (among others) determine one’s self-efficacy beliefs (Bandura, 
1997). On the other hand, beyond past performance and vicarious experience, the number of cues in a 
task also determine judgmental confidence (Bjorkman, 1992, 1994): the more information cues a task 
contains, the more confident one is with the task outcome. Cramer et al. (2009) comprehensively compare 
self-efficacy beliefs and judgmental confidence belief and show their distinctions in theoretical support, 
practical application, and construct composition. While prior studies have suggested the possible 
existence of overconfidence in the context of self-efficacy beliefs (Hayes et al., 2012; Hong et al., 2013; 
Stone, 1994), in this study, we focus on retrospective overconfidence. Figure 1 illustrates the relationships 
between these core constructs. 
2.2 Theoretical Causes to Overconfidence 
Studies in behavioral decision making and judgment under uncertainty have shown that two types of factors 
determine overconfidence: cognitive factors and motivational factors (Alba & Hutchinson, 2000; Keren, 
1997). Cognitive factors explain how individuals process information to make judgments and attribute 
overconfidence to cognitive strategies that misinterpret and/or selectively process information (Koriat et al., 
1980). That is, due to limited mental resource and capacity, individuals often adapt their cognitive strategies 
to balance the goal of being accurate and the goal of conserving limited cognitive resources (Johnson & 
Payne, 1985; Payne, 1976, 1982). Research has found individuals’ cognitive strategies to significantly affect 
decision quality and overconfidence in decision making (Brucks, 1985; Kassin, Rigby, & Castillo, 1991; 
Payne, 1976; Siegel-Jacobs & Yates, 1996; Stone, 1994; Tetlock & Kim, 1987). 
Many studies have investigated the effects of cognitive effort and attention allocation, which reflect one’s 
cognitive process in decision making (Alba & Hutchinson, 2000; Palmer, Brewer, & Horry, 2013; Johnson & 
Payne, 1985; Payne, 1982). Cognitive effort in judgment plays an important role in decision quality: for 
example, the more time an individual expends, the better the decision the individual reaches (Johnson & 
Payne, 1985; Payne, 1982). Individuals generally avoid effortful reasoning and thought (Payne, 1982), and 
the lack of decision effort (such as time) in judgment results in overconfidence bias in decision making 
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(Kassin et al., 1991; Siegel-Jacobs & Yates, 1996; Tetlock & Kim, 1987). Variability in attention allocation is 
another important factor that influences judgmental bias because people biasedly treat incoming information 
as valid rather than of indeterminate validity since they need to expend additional cognitive activity to 
properly encode and identify information as invalid (Gilber, 1991; Alba & Hutchinson, 2000). Therefore, when 
individuals have constrained resources (such as decision time) or something diverts their attention, they may 
not properly identify invalid information and, thus, form false beliefs (Alba & Hutchinson, 2000). Variability in 
what one pays attention to may influence one’s judgment outcomes (Keren, 1997). 
The motivational factors, on the other hand, suggest that individuals make biased judgments as a self-
motivating or self-enhancement (Alba & Hutchinson, 2000) mechanism. An example is the overconfidence 
exhibited by amateur bridge players who develop unrealistic and insensible perspectives, which leads to 
less accurate assessments than experts (Keren, 1997). Behavioral theories suggest that individuals are 
motivated to view themselves in a positive light and think that they are intelligent and knowledgeable 
(Taylor & Brown, 1988; Klayman, Soll, & Gonzalez-Vallejo, 1999). In the scenario of probability estimation, 
individuals may engage in wishful thinking and self-enhancement and, thus, estimate something (Griffin & 
Brenner, 2004) with excessive confidence. 
Such a distorted estimation may originate not only from individuals’ dispositional traits such as 
dispositional optimism (Scheier, Carver, & Bridges, 1994; Libby & Rennekamp, 2011) but also from their 
perception about their knowledge or competence of the judgment task. According to Heath and Tversky’s 
(1991) competence hypothesis, individuals feel more confident where they consider themselves 
knowledgeable or competent than in a context where they feel ignorant or uninformed. What an individual 
knows relative to what the individual can know determines whether the individual feels competent in a 
given context. General knowledge, familiarity, and experience all enhance one’s feeling competent 
possibly because individuals may have learned from experience that they generally do better in situations 
they understand than in situations where they have less knowledge.  
Research on consumer behavior supports Heath and Tversky’s (1991) competence hypothesis. The 
research shows that the perceived familiarity of an assertion or opinion (such as a product brand) results 
in a corresponding increase in its perceived validity (rather than actual validity) and a decrease in 
perceived uncertainty. As such, one can become overconfident (Alba & Hutchinson, 2000) because 
familiarity-based illusions of truth are particularly seductive: one can find it difficult to identify the source of 
an assertion’s familiarity, and the actual validity of the assertion may not be obvious (Alba & Hutchinson, 
2000). Since beliefs are precursors to decisions, as Alba and Hutchinson (2000) argue, misperceived 
validity will result in overly confident decisions. In addition, prior studies (Berger & Mitchell, 1989) also 
suggest that one can boost one’s judgmental confidence via direct experience with an object or repeated 
exposure to the object, such as receiving the same messages repeatedly. Overall, though, little research 
has investigated how confidence changes with experience and familiarity (Tsai, Klayman, & Hastie, 2008). 
2.3 Overconfidence in Phishing Detection 
In judgment under uncertainty (such as in detecting phishing emails), one often cannot observe decision 
accuracy until the event occurs (e.g., the “phisher” steals the individual’s personal information). Thus, 
decision makers often rely on confidence in their judgment as an indicator of accuracy to take subsequent 
actions (Camerer & Lovallo, 1999; Chuang & Lee, 2006; Hirshleifer & Luo, 2001). Because they do not 
know what they do not know (Berner & Graber, 2008), overconfident individuals fail to elicit complete and 
accurate information when judging something and fail to recognize the significance of data (such as 
misinterpreting information cues) and synthesize it (Graber, Franklin, & Gordon, 2005). Overconfidence 
also misguides people to take excessive risk under uncertainty (Camerer & Lovallo, 1999; Chuang & Lee, 
2006; Hirshleifer & Luo, 2001). By recognizing overconfidence in phishing email detection, researchers 
can design mechanisms such as training programs (Kumaraguru et al., 2007) to mitigate individuals’ 
overconfidence and enhance their judgment. 
Researchers have explored overconfidence in phishing detection in only a limited way. In an experiment 
with 53 undergraduates, Hong et al. (2013) found that approximately 92 percent of their participants 
misclassified phishing emails even though 89 percent indicated they were confident of their ability to 
identify phishing emails. In a similar study on 30 subjects, Kumaraguru et al. (2007) asked subjects to 
rate, on a scale of 1 to 7, how confident they were when making judgments on 19 emails. They found that 
participants claimed they knew about phishing and knew how to protect themselves but still fell for the 
phishing scams regardless. In another study on phishing website detection, Dhamija et al. (2006) asked 
22 subjects (university students and staff) to judge if a website was legitimate or not and to state their 
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confidence in their judgments on a five-point Likert scale. They found a mismatch between the confidence 
rating and actual judgmental accuracy. We can see that most of the studies have used a limited 
demography (as most subjects are university students), have employed small sample sizes, and have 
focused on prospective confidence (reflected by self-efficacy beliefs). Research has yet to address what 
causes retrospective overconfidence when individuals attempt to detect phishing. 
2.3.1 Measurement of Overconfidence  
A practical issue in empirical studies on overconfidence concerns its measurement (Moore and Healy 
2008). We adopt two metrics of overconfidence. The first, most dominant measurement is “overprecision” 
(Moore & Healy, 2008). It is the difference between the mean confidence (or mean subjective probability) 
and mean accuracy (i.e., the frequency or proportion of correct answers) of judgments in a task (Keren, 
1991; Lichtenstein et al., 1982; McClelland & Bolger, 1994): 
Overprecision = 𝑓𝑓̅ − ?̅?𝑑, (1) 
where 𝑓𝑓̅ = 1
𝑁𝑁
∑ 𝑓𝑓𝑛𝑛
𝑁𝑁
𝑛𝑛=1  and ?̅?𝑑 = 1𝑁𝑁∑ 𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛𝑁𝑁𝑛𝑛=1 , with N denoting the number of judgments in the task, fn 
denoting subjective probability (or the confidence) in each judgment, and dn denoting the accuracy of each 
judgment. We measured confidence (fn) after each email judgment; its value could range between 50 
percent and 100 percent, where 50 percent means by chance and 100 percent means very certain (Juslin 
& Olsson, 1997). We set the value of dn to 1 when one correctly judges an email as a phishing email or 
not and 0 for incorrectly judging it as a phishing email or not (Yates, 1982).  
The second measurement of overconfidence is “overestimation”. It is the difference between perceived 
accuracy (i.e., self-estimated frequency of correct judgments, which we call “self-estimated correctness” in 
this study and denote it with ?̃?𝑑) and actual accuracy (?̅?𝑑): 
Overestimation = ?̃?𝑑 − ?̅?𝑑, (2) 
In our study, we measured perceived accuracy or self-estimated correctness (?̃?𝑑) after each subject judged 
all emails as phishing emails or not.  
The literature shows that overprecision and overestimation are positively related because they share a 
common psychological basis in subjective feelings of competence (Larrick, Burson, & Soll, 2007). They 
also have distinct characteristics: overestimation is based on individuals’ overall estimation of their 
performance (i.e., frequency of correct answers) in N judgments, while overprecision is based on the 
average of the subjective probabilities (i.e., fn) assigned to each of the N judgments. Based on the 
probabilistic mental model (PMM), Gigerenzer, Hoffrage, and Kleinbölting (1991) argue that there is a 
systematic difference between probability judgment and frequency judgment: people do not estimate the 
frequency of correct responses by averaging the probabilities across all items but by judging the items’ 
overall difficulty, and the overall difficulty is a product of reflecting on those items. Therefore, the estimate 
of the overall performance of the N judgments is generally more accurate, though the average of the 
probabilities commonly exceeds the overall accuracy (Gigerenzer et al., 1991). We include and compare 
both in our empirical test.  
3 Hypothesis Development 
Guided by the conceptual framework we discuss in Section 2.2., we recognize cognitive and motivational 
factors that may influence overconfidence in phishing detection. We use “cognitive effort” and “variability 
in attention allocation” among email judgments to capture cognitive processes that a person may engage 
with in detecting phishing emails (Alba & Hutchinson, 2000; Palmer et al., 2013; Johnson & Payne, 1985; 
Payne, 1982). We consider both personal traits related to overconfidence and perceptions regarding one’s 
knowledge or competence in phishing detection as motivational factors. To capture personal traits 
associated with overconfidence, we include “dispositional optimism” (Scheier et al., 1994). To capture 
perception regarding one’s knowledge or competence in phishing detection, we include “perceived 
familiarity with the business entities” (Alba & Hutchinson 2000; Li, 2013) and “perceived self-efficacy of 
detecting phishing” (Alba & Hutchinson, 2000; Stone, 1994). Figure 2 illustrates the relationships between 
these predictors and overconfidence.   
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Figure 2. Research Model 
3.1 Impacts of Cognitive Factors 
From the information processing perspective, we expect that the more cognitive effort an individual spends 
on examining an email to reach a judgment, the more accurate and confident the judgment will be, which will 
yield less overconfidence. A rapid judgment may lead to substantial decision errors because individuals may 
not be able to examine a wider range of conceivably relevant cues. With increased effort in processing 
emails, individuals may be more likely to discover inconsistent cues and notice the abnormality of a phishing 
email and raise suspicion and, therefore, increase their accuracy in identifying such emails.  
Researchers have often used time spent to make a decision to reflect one’s cognitive effort (Bettman, 
Johnson, & Payne, 1990; Garbarino & Edell, 1997; Johnson & Payne, 1985; Payne, 1982). Studies on 
eyewitness identification decisions provide evidence about the impact of time to judgment on 
overconfidence. For example, Weber and Brewer (2004) found that exposure duration of suspects’ photos 
influenced eyewitness’ overconfidence. In particular, shorter exposure durations decreased accuracy 
more than it decreased confidence and, thus, increased overconfidence; longer exposure durations 
increased accuracy more than it increased confidence and, thus, reduced overconfidence; in both 
scenarios, though, the authors observed some extent of overconfidence in their experiment. Palmer et al. 
(2013) repeated the eyewitness experiment and observed similar findings; that is, shorter exposure 
durations yield greater overconfidence than longer exposure durations.  
In terms of detecting phishing emails, we expect that cognitive effort will have the same effect as research 
has shown exposure duration to have. First, cognitive effort influences to what extent an individual 
adequately analyzes information cues in an email to make a judgment. With the advances in technology, 
phishing emails are becoming increasingly deceptive and demand that users systematically examine 
various elements in the emails such as the senders, subject lines, and email bodies (Vishwanath, Herath, 
Chen, Wang, & Rao, 2011).  Doing so requires extensive effort. Nevertheless, with the increasing use of 
email as a popular means of communication, people feel more and more time pressure in dealing with 
information overload and, thus, may not spend enough time or pay enough attention to examine the 
emails, which may lead to misjudgment. For example, they may ignore standard security indicators such 
as the actual addresses in the emails (Dhamija et al., 2006; Pattinson, Jerram, Parsons, McCormac, & 
Butavicius, 2012) or disregard security warnings (Vance, Anderson, Kirwan, & Eargle, 2014). Therefore, 
more cognitive effort has a positive impact on judgmental accuracy. In terms of confidence, similarly, more 
effort spent on judging an email helps one find evidence or information supporting one’s judgment, which 
increases one’s confidence (Bjorkman, 1994; Gigerenzer et al., 1991). Studies in the decision making 
literature have well documented the effect of information on confidence (Peterson & Pitz, 1988). Taken 
together, we expect that both judgmental confidence and accuracy will improve with cognitive effort (such 
as time to decision) and that the correspondence between the two will improve as well (Weber & Brewer, 
2004) due to the systematic investigation of information and increased certainty in one’s judgment. 
Therefore, we hypothesize that: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Motivational factors: 
- Perceived familiarity with the business 
entities (H3 +) 
- Perceived self-efficacy of detecting 
phishing emails (H4 +) 
- Dispositional optimism (H5 +) 
 
Overconfidence 
Control variables: gender, age, 
education, income, number of daily 
emails, online transaction 
experience, prior victimization, and 
task easiness 
Cognitive factors: 
- Cognitive effort (H1 -) 
- Variability in attention allocation (H2 +) 
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H1: Cognitive effort reduces overconfidence in phishing email detection. 
Given a sequence of judgments on emails’ authenticity (such as processing one’s emails in the mailbox), 
individuals need to decide how to spend their limited mental resources across the emails. Individuals may 
choose to spread their effort across all their emails or focus on only a certain number. We argue that 
individuals who more greatly vary in how much attention they pay to a set of emails is associated with 
their using heuristic decision rules that requires less or incomplete information cues when judging them for 
authenticity (Payne, 1976). Such an attention-allocation strategy focuses on the more important, relevant, 
or confirming information from the decision maker’s point of view (Alba & Hutchinson, 2000; Payne, 
Bettman, & Luce, 1996), such as email layout, sender’s address, grammar, embedded URLs, or other 
information cues presented in emails. Such variations in attention result in individuals’ selectively 
retrieving supporting evidence and neglecting disconfirming evidence, which contributes to 
overconfidence (Alba & Hutchinson, 2000; Koriat et al., 1980). In other words, individuals may engage in 
such a strategy if they notice that an email cue confirms their initial feeling, and, thus, they may make an 
immediate judgment on the email’s authenticity. Individuals may spend more time on the emails where 
they cannot spot the cues confirming their initial hypothesis. Other studies show that individuals who are 
less selective in processing information are less susceptible to overconfidence bias and are more 
accurate in their judgments (Creyer, Bettman, & Payne, 1990; Stone & Schkade, 1994). In detecting 
phishing emails in particular, individuals may examine all necessary cues (several could exist) for all 
emails before reaching their judgment on them. Therefore, we hypothesize that: 
H2: Variability in attention allocation in an email increases overconfidence in phishing email 
detection. 
3.2 Impacts of Motivational Factors 
Following the competence hypothesis (Heath & Tversky, 1991), we study perceived familiarity with the 
business entities in the emails and perceived self-efficacy to capture individuals’ perceptions regarding 
their knowledge or competence in detecting phishing. We define perceived familiarity with the business 
entities as the degree to which one feels familiar with the business entities related to emails. On the one 
hand, we argue that perceived familiarity with the business entities may improve judgmental accuracy 
because it allows people to learn about the business entities (and related communication) and various 
practices in e-commerce, which helps them to discern between a legitimate and a malicious activity. Such 
experience helps one understand information cues in an email and judge whether the information cues 
point to a phishing email or a genuine email. For instance, many people may assume that governmental 
websites in the US end up with .gov, but, in fact, some of them end up with other top-level domains. 
Therefore, experience and familiarity with those websites and domains helps a person to better judge 
emails from the websites, which improves their judgmental accuracy. Note that, in a conceptual paper, 
Alba and Hutchinson (2000) argue that experience leaves accuracy unchanged.  
On the other hand, familiarity may lead to an excessive increase of confidence that exceeds the increase of 
accuracy and, thus, result in overconfidence in phishing detection. Bhandari and Hassanein (2012) explain 
that, due to familiarity, individuals become too wedded to their familiar views and may under-react to potentially 
important information. Indeed, a large number of studies have found evidence for such a phenomenon. For 
instance, the psychological literature shows that the more one is familiar with a field, the more likely one is at 
risk of being overconfident about their knowledge (Fischhoff, Slovic, & Lichtenstein, 1977; Heath & Tversky, 
1991). In the financial market, Blavatskyy (2008) argues that experienced traders place more weight on their 
own (private) signals than inexperienced traders, which leads them to be more prone to overconfidence 
(Glaser, Nöth, & Weber, 2004). In the online environment, Li (2013) suggests that personal familiarity with a 
website changes consumer behavior; that is, it induces good feelings about a website and reduces their privacy 
concerns. All these studies make the point that familiarity with an entity, such as the business in the email, may 
boost one’s overconfidence in judging it. Therefore, we hypothesize that: 
H3: Perceived familiarity with the business entities in emails increases overconfidence in phishing 
email detection. 
We define perceived self-efficacy of detecting phishing as individuals’ belief in their own ability to recognize 
phishing emails. Perceived self-efficacy of detecting phishing reflects one’s expected performance in 
phishing detection. While Alba and Hutchinson (2000) argue that the inflated feelings of self-efficacy may 
have a motivational effect that ultimately results in higher levels of performance, Stone (1994) suggests that 
the initial, “first-impression” self-efficacy judgments are biased toward overestimates of personal ability. 
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Further research shows that self-efficacy may increase the likelihood of one’s committing logic errors in 
analytic games and leads to overconfidence (Vancouver, Thompson, Tischner, & Putka, 2002). Such a 
positive self-efficacy expectation is likely to increase post-decision perceptions of performance more than it 
increases the actual performance and, thus, leads to overconfidence (Moores & Chang, 2009).  
We expect that self-efficacy will have the same effect on phishing email detection. On the one hand, self-
efficacy of detecting phishing may decrease one’s chance of being phished.  Because many phishing 
emails pretend to introduce a problem and then offer a solution in the same message, such as recovering 
the password, releasing space in mailbox, checking the status of a package, and so on, such a scheme 
may work for low self-efficacy individuals (Wright & Marett, 2010). High self-efficacy individuals may have 
relevant knowledge and skills to recognize those messages as phishing. On the other hand, we expect 
self-efficacy to have a positive effect on confidence in phishing detection (see Figure 1). From the 
motivational theory perspective, Vancouver et al. (2002, p. 507) cite Bandura and Jourden (1991) and 
argue that self-efficacy “creates little incentive to expend the increased effort needed to attain high levels 
of performance”. In other words, once individuals spend their amount of expected effort, they may feel 
confident in the output and discontinue the effort. Individuals with higher self-efficacy of detecting phishing 
may expect phishing detection to be effortless and, therefore, may feel confident in their task performance. 
Taken together, we suggest that, although self-efficacy increases both detection accuracy and confidence, 
it increases confidence even more, which leads to overconfidence. Therefore, we hypothesize that: 
H4: Perceived self-efficacy of detecting phishing emails increases overconfidence in phishing email 
detection. 
Prior literature also suggests that personal traits such as dispositional optimism, a generalized positive 
expectation for the future (Scheier et al., 1994), results in overconfidence in judgment under uncertainty 
(Libby & Rennekamp, 2011). From a positive perspective, research has demonstrated that dispositional 
optimism generally improves both an individual’s physical (Peterson & Bossio, 2001) and psychological 
well-being (Diener, Sub, Lucas, & Smith, 1999). However, a high level of dispositional optimism can also 
lead to one’s relying on biases and heuristics that result in overconfidence (Hayward, Shepherd, & Griffin, 
2006), which research has shown to undermine one’s decision making ability in an uncertain environment 
(Gilovich, Griffin, & Kahneman, 2002; Hmieleski & Baron, 2009; Lovallo & Kahneman, 2003). Specifically, 
dispositional optimism influences a person’s desirability for certain outcomes and the confidence in self-
ability to achieve those outcomes, but its effect on actual results is unfounded (Alba & Hutchinson, 2000). 
Following this logic, in the scenario of detecting phishing, individuals with high dispositional optimism may 
have high confidence in dealing with phishing attacks, but their detection accuracy may not be necessarily 
better. Therefore, we hypothesize that: 
H5: Dispositional optimism increases overconfidence in phishing email detection. 
In addition to the above research constructs, we included a few control variables in the study, including 
online transaction experience (i.e., the degree to which an individual uses the Internet as a channel to 
carry out business transactions such as buying products online, paying bills and using online banking, and 
trading stocks online), gender, age, education level, income, number of daily emails, and prior 
victimization related to identity theft (Pattinson et al., 2012; Vishwanath et al., 2011). We also included 
task easiness (i.e., how easy it is to recognize the nature of a given email set, legitimate or not, for an 
average person) as a control variable due to the hard-easy effect in judgmental tasks (particularly for 
overprecision; Juslin & Olsson 1997; Keren, 1997). In Section 4, we describe the research method we 
employed to empirically test the model. 
4 Research Method and Data Collection 
4.1 Experimental Design 
We developed a survey experiment using Qualtrics Research Suite to collect data for model testing. In this 
experiment, each participant judged 16 emails (presented as images of the emails) randomly chosen from a 
pool of 50 phishing emails and genuine business emails. We measured their judgmental confidence, 
accuracy, and cognitive and motivational factors. Appendix A describes how we developed the email pool.  
In the recent past, some researchers have studied phishing detection by relying on individuals’ responses 
to images of phishing emails (or websites): these studies presented participants with images of emails (or 
websites) mixed with phishing and genuine business ones and asked how they would respond if they saw 
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such emails or websites (Downs et al., 2006; Downs, Holbrook, & Cranor, 2007; Pattinson et al., 2012; 
Sheng, Holbrook, Kumaraguru, Cranor, & Downs, 2010; Vishwanath et al., 2011; Wang, Herath, Chen, 
Viswanath, & Rao, 2012) or alternately queried if the e-mails or websites were genuine (Anandpara, 
Dingman, & Jakobsson, 2007; Dhamija et al., 2006; Furnell, 2007). Research has proven this approach to 
be the most efficient in collecting large samples of data in phishing detection research given the ethical 
concerns on collecting data using other approaches (Pattinson et al., 2012). Industry has also used such 
an approach to help laypeople become aware of their ability to detect phishing attacks (see 
http://www.sonicwall.com/furl/phishing/).  
Understanding that participants cannot interact with the email images in this survey experiment, we 
selected emails that contained various detection cues revealed in the images besides clear message 
content and email layout. For example, some email images showed a mouse-over URL at the bottom if 
the image hid the URL. Some emails contained an attachment (see the example in Appendix A). In 
addition, all the emails had the senders’ email address visible. We modified the receivers’ addresses if it 
was private. We did not change the receivers’ address if the email had no receiver address shown, was 
sent to a group (for example, undisclosed recipients), or was clearly not a private email (for example, 
Paypal as the receiver). In the consent form of the survey, we emphasized that all these emails were the 
actual ones except where we removed private information.  
The experiment proceeded as follows. First, participants filled out a consent form that described the 
objective of the study and instructions for the experiment. We then presented them with items that 
measured perceived self-efficacy of detecting phishing. Subsequently, each participant finished the email 
judgment task that sequentially presented 16 email images that they judged as legitimate or not. In the 
consent form of the survey, we stated that, if the participant believed the email was truly sent from the 
business entity it claimed to be (i.e., a genuine business email), the participant should choose “yes", and, 
if the participant believed that the email was from someone pretending to be what the email claimed to be 
(i.e., a phishing email), the participant should choose "no". We also asked the participants to indicate, on a 
scale from 50 (by chance) and 100 (very confident), how confident they were for each judgment (i.e., fn). 
We then asked the participants how familiar they were with the business entity indicated in the email. After 
the participants judged all the 16 emails, they each estimated the percentage of correct answers they 
made (i.e., ?̃?𝑑), which we used as an alternative measure of confidence (Moore & Healy, 2008). 
Figure A1 in the Appendix shows an example of the included emails and the four questions associated 
with each judgment. All 16 emails followed the same presentation format. At the end, the participants 
completed other measurements including dispositional optimism, gender, age, income, education, the 
number of emails received daily, online transaction experience, and prior victimization.  
We pretested the survey protocol with a group of faculty members, PhD students, undergraduate 
students, and administrative staff from a research university in southwestern US. Subsequently, we pilot 
tested it with a group of undergraduate students from the same university before actually collecting data. 
The pretest helped to ensure the clarity and content validity of the instrument, and the pilot test helped to 
verify the response from the participants. We found that 16 emails were ideal for the study, which allowed 
each participant to complete the experiment in about 15 minutes. We made minor changes to the survey 
following the feedback from the pretest and the pilot test. 
4.2 Measurement of Independent Variables 
We measured the two cognitive factors with objective data. We recorded time elapsed between showing 
the email image and the first click the participant made (which was the click needed to judge whether the 
mail was legitimate or not) and used the sum of the time spent for the 16 judgments to measure cognitive 
effort (H1) (Bettman et al., 1990; Garbarino & Edell, 1997; Johnson & Payne, 1985; Payne, 1982). 
Following prior literature in behavioral decision making (Brucks, 1985; Payne, 1976; Stone, 1994), we 
calculated the coefficient of variation (CV) of the time expended on the emails to measure variability in 
attention allocation (H2), where high CV indicated a high variability.   
We measured the other independent variables with self-reported data (see Table 2). First, we measured 
perceived familiarity with business entity in an email (H3) with a single item. Since the unit of analysis of 
overconfidence was at an individual level (instead of individual-judgment level) as prior research has shown 
(Brenner, Koehler, Liberman, & Tversky, 1996; Griffin & Brenner, 2004; Klayman et al., 1999; Lichtenstein et 
al., 1982; Lichtenstein & Fischhoff, 1977; Pulford, 1996), we aggregated measures of business entity 
familiarity from the 16 emails. We adapted two items from prior literature (Chen, Wang, Herath, & Rao, 2011; 
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Herath et al., 2012) to measure perceived self-efficacy of detecting phishing (H4). We calculated the latent 
score of perceived self-efficacy by loading these two items together based on a factor analysis that exhibited 
satisfactory reliability and convergent validity. We assessed dispositional optimism (H5) by the aggregated 
score of the 10-item Life Orientation Test Revised (LOT-R) (Scheier et al., 1994). 
Table 2. Survey Items 
Constructs Items 
Perceived familiarity 
with business 
entities 
How familiar do you think you are (not at all, a little, some, much, or a lot) with the business 
entity indicated in the email? 
We aggregated the above item from 16 emails for the construct. 
Perceived self-
efficacy of detecting 
phishing (Chen et 
al., 2011; Herath et 
al., 2012) 
Please indicate to what extent (strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree nor disagree, agree, 
or strongly agree) you agree with each of the following statements: 
• I can recognize phishing emails. 
• I can differentiate phishing emails from legitimate ones. 
Dispositional 
optimism (Scheier 
et al., 1994) 
Please indicate to what extent (strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree nor disagree, agree, 
or strongly agree) you agree with each of the following statements: 
• In uncertain times, I usually expect the best. 
• It’s easy for me to relax. (Filler item; discarded from analysis) 
• If something can go wrong for me, it will. (Reverse-worded) 
• I’m always optimistic about my future. 
• I enjoy my friends a lot. (Filler item; discarded from analysis) 
• It’s important for me to keep busy. (Filler item; discarded from analysis) 
• I hardly ever expect things to go my way. (Reverse-worded) 
• I don’t get upset too easily. (Filler item; discarded from analysis) 
• I rarely count on good things happening to me. (Reverse-worded) 
• Overall, I expect more good things to happen to me than bad. 
Online transaction 
experiences 
How often  (never, rarely, sometimes, most of the time, or always) do you engage in the 
following online activities? 
• Buying and selling stocks or mutual funds online. 
• Buying products or services online with a credit card, a debit card, or a payment service 
such as PayPal. 
• Paying bills (such as electronic, utility, credit cards, or loans) online. 
• Accessing bank accounts (such as checking, savings, or mortgage) online. 
Prior victimization of 
identity theft 
Have you ever experienced the following situations? (Yes or no) 
• Someone used or attempted to use your personal information without permission to obtain 
new credit cards or loans, run up debts, open other accounts, or commit other fraud. 
• Someone used or attempted to use your credit cards without permission. 
• Someone used or attempted to use your accounts such as your wireless phone account, 
bank account, or debit/check cards without your permission. 
We measured control variables such as gender, age, education level, income, and the number of daily 
emails with single items. We measured online transaction experience with the sum of four items (see 
Table 2); each captured an aspect of the experience. We measured prior victimization of identity theft as 
the sum of three items (see Table 2). We also used another control variable, task easiness, to measure 
the overall easiness (or difficulty) of judging the 16 emails randomly assigned to a subject because 
research has found that people tend to be overconfident in dealing with difficult tasks rather than easy 
tasks, known as the hard-easy effect (Juslin & Olsson, 1997; Keren, 1997). We calculated it based on the 
mean value of the easiness of the emails that a subject received, and we derived the easiness of each 
email from the proportion of subjects who judged the same email correctly. 
4.3 Survey Administration 
We collected data relying on the professional survey service company, Qualtrics, who draw data from a 
sample from the US population2. Compared with a lab experiment in which one invites participants to 
finish an experiment in a lab room at a given time, using Qulatrics with a survey allows one to access a 
                                                     
2 A brochure explaining how Qualtrics recruits their participants is available on request from the first author. 
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broader demographic base and a larger sample size economically and to provide a better generalizability 
of our results. We filtered out those respondents who did not have any online transaction experience 
(answered “never” to all four items measuring online transaction experience) given they were not relevant 
to the phishing attacks in our study (which we designed to solicit online financial account, credit number, 
and other personal information). We collected 600 valid responses from 47 States in US. Thirty-six 
percent of the respondents were male. The mean age was 52, with a range from 19 to 89. Seventy-six 
percent (76.3%) of respondents had an education of some college or more. Most respondents were 
white/not Hispanic (84%). Forty-four percent (44.3%) of respondents had a family income higher than 
US$50,000. Sixty percent of the respondents had more than one credit card in their wallet or purse. 
5 Data Analysis and Results 
5.1 Descriptive Analysis 
We first conducted a descriptive analysis of overconfidence in phishing detection based on the two 
measurement metrics (see Equations 1 and 2) to learn its extent. Table 3 presents the ranges, means, 
and standard deviations of the metrics, and Figure 3 illustrates their statistical distributions. At an 
aggregated level, the results suggest the prevalence of overconfidence in phishing detection in the 
overprecision measure only (mean = .14, standard deviation = .17), but not in the overestimation measure 
(mean = 0.00, standard deviation = .24). In particular, 80 percent of the participants had a score of 
overprecision greater than 0, while 45 percent had a score of overestimation greater than zero. 
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics of the Overconfidence Metrics (overprecision and overestimation) 
and Related Measures 
Metric Minimum Maximum Mean Standard deviation 
Overprecision -.31 .72 .14 .17 
Overestimation -.75 .63 .00 .24 
Accuracy (?̅?𝑑) .25 1.00 .67 .15 
Subjective probability (𝑓𝑓)̅ .50 1.00 .81 .12 
Self-estimated correctness (?̃?𝑑) .00 1.00 .68 .21 
 
Figure 3. Histogram of the Overconfidence Metrics 
The proportion of participants exhibiting overestimation was significantly less than that exhibiting 
overprecision, which supports Gigerenzer et al.’s (1991) view that frequency estimates (i.e., overestimation) 
are generally more accurate than probability estimates (i.e., overprecision). We also compared the difference 
between subjective probability (𝑓𝑓̅) and self-estimated correctness (?̃?𝑑) in the same person and found a 
significant difference based on a paired t-test. The results seem to confirm the systematic difference 
between probability judgment and frequency judgment in the line of Gigerenzer et al. (1991).  
Table 4 presents the bivariate correlations between the variables in our research model. Overprecision 
and overestimation were highly correlated (r = .628), which echoes prior studies (Larrick et al., 2007).  
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Table 4. Correlation Coefficients 
 (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
(1) Overprecision .628** -.723** .474** .196** -0.07 .154** .224** 0.061 .168** 
(2) Overestimation -- -.515** .219** .778** -0.054 .111** .088* .086* .169** 
(3) Accuracy -- -- .266** .138** .169** -.165** 0.032 .159** -0.02 
(4) Subjective probability -- -- -- .449** .118** 0.004 .354** .288** .210** 
(5) Self-estimated correctness -- -- -- -- 0.062 0.007 .126** .216** .181** 
(6) Cognitive effort -- -- -- -- -- .330** 0.02 0.033 0.036 
(7) Variability in attention -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.03 -0.018 -0.002 
(8) Entity familiarity  -- -- -- -- -- -- -- .151** .089* 
(9) Self-efficacy -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- .139** 
(10) Disp. optimism -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
5.2 Hypotheses Testing 
To test the hypotheses, we conducted an OLS regression analysis on each dependent variable with SPSS 
(ver. 21). To examine potential multicollinearity among the constructs in the regression models, we 
performed the variance inflation factor (VIF) test. The VIFs were all well below 3.3, which indicates that 
multicollinearity was not a cause of concern (Petter, Straub, & Rai, 2007). We also plotted the histogram 
and the normal P-P plot of standardized residuals for all regression models, and both did not present 
evidence of violating the normality assumption required for OLS regressions. 
 
Table 5. Regression Results (Standardized Coefficients) 
Independent variables 
Dependent variables 
Over- 
precision 
Over- 
estimation Accuracy 
Subjective 
probability 
Self- 
estimated 
correctness 
Cognitive effort (H1) -0.137*** -0.102** 0.239*** 0.113** .058 
Variability in attention (H2) 0.189*** 0.141*** -0.243*** -0.046 -.014 
Familiarity with entities (H3) 0.167** 0.044 0.046 0.291*** .084* 
Self-efficacy (H4) 0.019 0.075^ 0.145*** 0.210*** .193*** 
Disp. optimism (H5) 0.145*** 0.147*** -0.043 0.147*** .138*** 
Task easiness -0.142*** -0.125** 0.223*** 0.086* .020 
Transaction experience 0.077^ -0.017 -0.064 0.025 -.066 
Age -0.007 0.019 0.019 0.016 .036 
Gender -0.095** -0.171*** 0.133*** 0.036 -.100** 
Number of emails -0.015 0.014 0.058 0.052 .059 
Income -0.030 0.002 0.068^ 0.045 .053 
Education 0.003 0.043 0.012 0.011 .058 
Prior victimization -0.076^ -0.053 0.079 -0.006 -.004 
R2 .153 .110 .189 .230 .106 
Adjusted R2 .134 .090 .171 .213 .086 
^ p-value < 0.10 (2-tailed) ; * p-value < 0.05 (2-tailed) ; ** p-value < 0.01 (2-tailed); *** p-value < 0.001 (2-tailed) 
Table 5 presents standardized coefficients of the regression results. The results show that cognitive effort 
reduced overprecision (β = -.137, p < .001) and overestimation (β = -.102, p < .01). In particular, the 
decrease of overconfidence arises due to a stronger increase in judgmental accuracy (β = .239, p < .001) 
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than in confidence (β =.113, p < .01 for subjective probability, and β = .058, p > .10 for self-estimated 
correctness). Thus, our results support H1. 
High variability in attention allocation increased overprecision (β = .189, p < .001) and overestimation (β = 
.141, p < .001). In particular, the decrease in accuracy caused an increase in overconfidence (β = -.243, p 
< .001), and, at the same time, high variability in attention allocation did not significantly influence 
confidence (β = -.046, p > .1 for subjective probability, and β = -.014, p > .1 for self-estimated 
correctness). Thus, our results support H2. 
The results also show that familiarity with business entities increased overprecision significantly (β = .167, 
p < .01) but not overestimation (β = .044, p >.10). In particular, familiarity with business entities 
significantly increased subject probability (β = .291, p < .001) but had no significant impact on accuracy (β 
= .046, p > .10), which resulted in increased overprecision. It also increased self-estimated correctness 
significantly (β = .084, p < .05) but not large enough to result in overestimation. The non-effect on 
accuracy seems to support Alba and Hutchinson’s (2000) argument that experience leaves accuracy 
unchanged. Thus, our results partially support H3.  
Furthermore, self-efficacy in phishing detection marginally increased overestimation (β = .075, p < .10), 
and its effect on overprecision was insignificant. Examining its impacts on accuracy and confidence 
showed that self-efficacy in phishing detection increased both accuracy (β = .145, p < .001) and 
confidence (β = .210, p < .001 for subjective probability, and β = .193, p < .001 for self-estimated 
correctness). Therefore, our results only very weakly support H4.  
Finally, dispositional optimism increased overprecision (β = .145, p < .001) and overestimation (β = .147, p 
< .001). In particular, dispositional optimism significantly influenced confidence (β = .147, p < .001 for 
subjective probability and β = .138, p < .001 for self-estimated correctness), and, as expected, it had no 
significant impact on accuracy (β = -.043, p > .1). Thus, our results support H5. 
For the control variables, gender had a significant impact on overprecision (β = -.095, p < .01) and 
overestimation (β = -.171, p < .001), which suggests that women are better than men in detecting phishing 
emails. We found that task easiness reduced overprecision (β = -.142, p < .001) and overestimation (β = -.125, 
p < .01). Such outcomes (see Table 5) result from its strong impacts on accuracy (β = .223, p < .001) but a 
relatively weak impact on confidence (β = .086, p < .05 for subjective probability and β = .020, p > .10 for self-
estimated correctness), which is consistent with the hard-easy effect shown in prior studies (particularly for 
overprecision; Juslin and Olsson 1997; Keren 1997). None of the other control variables had significant impacts 
on the overconfidence metrics. The R2s of the dependent variables ranged from .110 to .230.  
5.3 Predicting Accuracy with Judgmental Confidence 
We ran a sequence of regressions using both judgmental confidence (i.e., subjective probability and self-
estimated correctness) and perceived self-efficacy to predict accuracy. Table 6 shows the results for the 
regression models. We can see that all the R2s were very low, which suggests that, overall, all these 
confidence beliefs are poor predictors of accuracy, so that confidence is not a reliable indicator of 
judgment accuracy. The results highlight the issue of relying on judgmental confidence to guide one’s 
behavior in phishing detection. 
Table 6. Predicting Accuracy with Confidence Beliefs (Standardized Coefficients) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Self-efficacy .159*** -- .090* -- .136*** .089* 
Subjective probability -- .266*** .240*** -- -- .234*** 
Self-estimated correctness -- -- -- .138*** .108** .013 
R2 .025 .071 .078 .019 .037 .078 
* p-value < 0.05 (2-tailed) ; ** p-value < 0.01 (2-tailed); *** p-value < 0.001 (2-tailed) 
These results also suggest that, in terms of predicting phishing email detection accuracy, the subjective 
probability measure of confidence performs better than the other two measures (i.e., both self-efficacy and 
self-estimated correctness).  Models 1 to 3 compared subjective probability with perceived self-efficacy. 
With self-efficacy alone (β = .159, p < .001), Model 1 explained 2.5 percent of variance in detection 
accuracy; with subjective probability alone (β = .266, p < .001), Model 2 explained 7.1 percent of variance 
in accuracy; with both self-efficacy (β = .090, p < .05) and subjective probability (β = .240, p < .001), Model 
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3 explained 7.8 percent of variance in accuracy. These three models indicate that perceived self-efficacy 
only marginally contributed to judgmental accuracy and that subjective probability can partial it out. 
Models 1, 4 and 5 compared self-estimated correctness with self-efficacy. The results show that both 
factors had similar impacts on accuracy. Model 6 compared all three confidence beliefs simultaneously. It 
shows that subjective probability (β = .234, p < .001) had the strongest effect on detection accuracy, while 
the effect of self-efficacy (β = .089, p<.05) was marginal and the effect of self-estimated correctness (β = 
.013, p>.1) was insignificant. 
6 Discussion and Conclusions 
Extending prior literature in behavioral decision making and judgment under uncertainty, we examined 
overconfidence in phishing email detection. We distinguished between retrospective overconfidence 
(caused by judgmental confidence such as the subjective probability of an answer’s correctness) from 
prospective overconfidence (caused by self-efficacy beliefs), which highlights the importance of studying 
the former. We examined the impacts of five antecedents on retrospective overconfidence. In a survey 
experiment on 600 online users, we found that cognitive effort decreased overconfidence and that 
variability in attention allocation, dispositional optimism, and familiarity with the business entities in emails 
all increased overconfidence in phishing email detection. Perceived self-efficacy increased both 
judgmental confidence and accuracy, but its effect on overconfidence was marginal. Further, all 
confidence beliefs poorly predicted detection accuracy and poorly explained its variance, which highlights 
the issue of relying on judgmental confidence to guide one’s behavior in detecting phishing. In comparing 
the various types of confidence beliefs (see Table 6), we found that judgmental confidence, in the form of 
subjective probability, had a relatively stronger power to predict detection accuracy than both self-efficacy 
beliefs and self-estimated correctness.  
The marginal effect of self-efficacy on retrospective overconfidence deserves further scrutiny. As we can 
see from Table 5, self-efficacy belief was positively associated with judgmental accuracy and retrospective 
confidence (which includes subjective probability and self-estimated correctness). However, its 
relationship to overconfidence is quite weak. In other words, self-efficacy belief did not increase 
retrospective confidence more than it increased task performance. Busey et al. (2000) argue that 
retrospective confidence (especially subjective probability) and accuracy are based on information from 
the same sources, such as information in one’s memory that one recalls to judge something, but 
prospective confidence (or self-efficacy) is based on one’s expectation of capability in achieving the task. 
Therefore, in phishing detection, cognitive processes (measured by cognitive effort and variability in 
attention allocation in our study) or situational motivational factors (such as perceived familiarity with 
business entities) rather than the pre-task self-efficacy beliefs more significantly influence the 
correspondence between retrospective confidence and accuracy. This result further justifies the need to 
distinguish between retrospective confidence and prospective confidence. 
6.1 Contributions and Implications 
The study has two potential contributions. First, to the best of our knowledge, this study is the first one on 
retrospective overconfidence in phishing email detection. Its distinction from prospective overconfidence 
(see Table 1 and Figure 1) helps advance theories in both behavioral decision making and phishing 
detection. As we mention above, prior studies on individuals’ phishing detection abilities overemphasize 
prospective overconfidence, which ignores the fact that retrospective overconfidence, caused by 
judgmental confidence such as subjective probability, is more directly related to judgments and 
subsequent behaviors (Tang et al., 2014). Following recent literature on the distinction between self-
efficacy and judgmental confidence (Busey et al., 2000; Cramer et ., 2009), our empirical test results show 
that, while both play a role in predicting phishing detection accuracy,  judgmental confidence partials out 
the effect of self-efficacy (see Table 6), which explains why self-efficacy only has a marginal effect on 
overconfidence. This finding suggests that future research on behavioral decision making and on phishing 
detection should incorporate judgmental confidence as an important factor to consider.  
On the other hand, one should interpret the importance of judgmental confidence with caution due to the 
prevalence of overconfidence in judgments, especially overprecision (see Figure 3a). Our study reveals 
that overconfidence is quite common in phishing email detection. This finding suggests that we need to 
recognize sources of overconfidence and help devise mechanisms to reduce such bias. Our results (Table 
5) show that three factors (i.e., variability in attention allocation, dispositional optimism, and familiarity with 
the business entities) increase and that one factor (i.e., cognitive effort) reduces overconfidence. As such, 
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our results present a starting point to conduct further research to investigate other motivational and/or 
cognitive factors that may influence overconfidence. The conceptualization and measurement of 
overconfidence (see Equations 1 and 2) enables further research on this topic. 
Note that we studied two forms of overconfidence. We found at the aggregate level that subjects exhibited 
overprecision (not overestimation). We explain in Section 5.1 that probability judgment (i.e., overprecision) 
and frequency judgment (i.e., overestimation) differ and that the latter tends to be more accurate than the 
former (Gigerenzer et al., 1991): individuals may not know whether they picked the right answer to each 
question but may know how many questions they answered correctly. The finding has implications for 
behavioral decision making research in which researchers continue to debate judgmental bias or simply 
the manipulation of task difficulty causes overconfidence (Keren, 1997). Although it goes beyond our 
scope here to resolve the issue, the unbiased overestimation measure in our study (see Figure 3-b) 
suggests that one may use it as a benchmark to verify the overall difficulty of the judgmental tasks in 
research: if there were overestimation, the tasks might be overly difficult for the subjects and vice versa. 
Second, our recognizing the antecedents to overconfidence, along with some significant control variables, 
enables researchers and practitioners to devise practical mechanisms to help users reduce such bias and 
improve judgment. Klayman et al. (1999, p. 218) point out that “we are often called upon to make a choice 
between two alternatives, and then our subjective confidence in that choice determines how much we 
commit to one course, how much we seek further information, and how much we hedge our bets”. Our 
study shows that one’s subjective confidence may not provide an accurate guidance in phishing detection. 
Therefore, when we educate individuals about the knowledge and skills to detect phishing, we need to 
make them aware of such judgmental bias and teach them the strategies to reduce or eliminate the bias 
(Fischhoff, 1982; Larrick, 2004). One may do so by offering warnings and feedback (Moores & Chang, 
2009; Sharp et al., 1988) based on the overconfidence metrics we introduced: for example, one could 
assess users for their overconfidence before and after training programs to improve their self-awareness 
of the bias and willingness to learn to reduce the bias via training.  
The training programs should focus on the cognitive and motivational factors we recognized, such as 
spending more effort in inspecting various aspects of the emails, allocating time evenly across emails 
(rather than selectively processing emails), and overcoming biases caused by perceived familiarity with 
the business entities and by dispositional optimism. Performance feedback about one’s judgmental 
confidence and accuracy may also be necessary to help decrease overconfidence.  
We emphasize the importance of formal training in helping people fight against phishing attacks because our 
study shows that prior victimization of identity theft does not automatically translate to improved awareness 
of the risks or readiness to detect phishing. The impact of task easiness on overconfidence then suggests 
that the difficulty of training programs is important to produce the best training outcomes. The fact is that 
easy tasks tend to reduce overconfidence and hard tasks tend to increase overconfidence, which implies 
that, if the training program is too simple (e.g., introducing basic concepts of phishing without challenging the 
participants’ actual abilities), the participants may become overconfident when processing real-world 
phishing emails that are more tricky and difficult. On the other hand, if individuals receive tough training, they 
will exhibit less overconfidence when dealing with real-world emails because those emails would be 
relatively easier to detect. Therefore, the training program should comprise challenging tasks but that are not 
too challenging to destruct one’s self-efficacy beliefs because our study also shows that, although self-
efficacy does not help bring down overconfidence, it improves both judgmental confidence and accuracy, 
which is valuable to phishing detection. Finally, our study suggests that, due to gender difference in 
overconfidence, male users should receive adequate training to combat phishing. 
6.2 Limitations and Future Studies 
Our study has several limitations. First, the experimental setting may not fully capture a person’s 
responses to phishing attacks in the real word because other factors, such as one’s existing email load at 
the time of attack, may have an impact on judgment (Vishwanath et al. 2011). As we mention above, the 
experimental setting is the most efficient for collecting large samples of data in phishing research. In 
addition, behavioral decision making studies have also studied judgmental confidence almost exclusively 
with lab experiments (e.g., Hong et al., 2014; Palmer et al., 2013; Tang et al., 2014; Weber & Brewer, 
2004). If possible, though, one may employ mock attacks to test individuals’ actual responses to phishing 
emails, but one should carry out such methods with caution. 
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Second, our using images (instead of presenting emails via an email client) may have limited individuals’ ability 
to correctly judge the emails due to the loss of information cues and their lack of interactivity with the emails. 
Tang et al. (2014) show that visualization and interactivity together reduce overconfidence in judgment. Future 
research could address this limitation by presenting emails via an email client (but not pictures of them). 
Nevertheless, to minimize the impact on judgments, we carefully selected emails that contained various 
detection cues, such as mouse-over URLs at the bottom, clear message content and email layout, and 
senders’ email addresses. These cues are the typical information cues people use to detect phishing emails. 
Third, we followed other studies in phishing literature (Downs et al., 2006; 2007; Pattinson et al., 2012; 
Sheng et al., 2010; Vishwanath et al., 2011; Wang et al., 2012) to explicitly ask participants to determine 
whether an email image was legitimate or not. While we assured the participants in our consent form we 
anonymously collected data and were interested only in their candid thoughts and opinions, such a 
priming may affect participants’ choices and lead them to misclassify a business email as a phishing email 
(Pattinson et al., 2012).  
The fact that we selected five antecedents can perhaps be considered to be a limitation. As we mention above, 
we selected the five antecedents because prior studies have recognized these cognitive and motivational 
factors. Our efforts present a starting point to empirically testing retrospective overconfidence in phishing 
detection. Future research may include other factors. For example, one could further investigate how anti-
phishing tools, such as visual email authentication services (Herath et al., 2012; Wang, Chen, Herath, & Rao, 
2009) or other detection tools (Dinev & Hu, 2007; Zahedi, Abbasi, & Chen, 2015), and education programs 
may change one’s judgment process and, thereby, one’s overconfidence in detecting phishing. 
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Appendix: Instrument Design 
Following prior studies on phishing email detection (Downs et al., 2006, 2007; Pattinson et al., 2012; 
Sheng et al., 2010; Vishwanath et al., 2011; Wang et al., 2012), we used images of phishing emails and 
genuine business emails in the survey experiment. We randomly selected the emails from a pool of 50 
images and presented them in a random order to avoid confounding with the email presentation order and 
learning effects. Half of the fifty email images were legitimate business emails sent by banks or financial 
institutions in the US and half were phishing emails targeted at customers of banks or financial institutions 
in the US. Customers of banks and financial institutions have been traditionally heavily targeted by identity 
thieves for their personal information, bank account, credit card number, and online banking login 
information in the past several years (Hong, 2012; RSA, 2012). We collected these emails from the 
Internet and banking colleagues’ and our email inboxes. When we included the emails from the public 
domain in our survey, their text needed to be clearly legible (because we made most of the emails 
available in the form of image files), together with the sender, the receiver, the time sent, and title exactly 
as shown in the email that reached one’s inbox. Different emails present varying informational cues and 
content. We changed the receiver’s email address to a fictional email address if an email originally had it 
properly displayed and set the name to a fictional name if someone’s name appeared in the original email. 
In the consent form of the survey, we stated that all these emails were actual ones that had arrived in 
someone's mailbox known to the researchers. Figure A1 illustrates an example. 
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Figure A1. Email Judgment in the Survey   
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